Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 73

Issue 2

Article 7

1984

Kentucky Law Survey: Insurance
Richard H. C. Clay
Woodward, Hobson & Fulton

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Clay, Richard H. C. (1984) "Kentucky Law Survey: Insurance," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 73: Iss. 2, Article
7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol73/iss2/7

This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Insurance
By

RICHARD

H. C.

CLAY*

INTRODUCTION

The two most significant decisions on Kentucky insurance
law during this Survey period address the insurer's duty to act
in good faith.' Other recent cases address coverage provisions,
exclusions, and liability limitations in insurance contracts. In
addition, Kentucky courts again have had occasion to "flail
about in that legislative morass styled the 'Motor Vehicle Re,2
parations Act' and known as the '[N]o-[Flault' law."
I.
A.

THE CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT

Breach of Insurer's Covenant to Act in Good Faith

Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 3 dealt with an
insurer's duty to act in good faith when handling claims made
by its insured. In Feathers, policyholders of a homeowner's fire
insurance policy suffered a fire loss in which their home and
personal belongings were destroyed. They filed a sworn proof
of loss in a timely manner. The insurer, State Farm, rejected
the proof of loss because the claim allegedly contained misrepresentations. The policyholders ultimately filed a complaint
containing two counts: (1) dwelling damage, personal property

* Partner, in the firm of Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, Louisville, Kentucky.
Former Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Louisville. A.B. 1973, Davidson
College; Rockefeller Fellow, 1973-74, Yale University Divinity School; J.D. 1977, University of Kentucky. Member, Board of Directors, Kentucky Defense Council, Inc. This
Article is written in memory of my friend and partner, John P. Sandidge (1916-1984).
Additionally, during its 1984 Session the Kentucky General Assembly enacted
KY. REv. STAT. § 304.12-230 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1984) (eff. 7-13-84) [hereinafter
cited as KRS] on Unfair Claims Settlement practices. For a discussion of this legislation
see-Underwood, Kentucky Law Survey - Insurance, 72 Ky. L.J. 403, 403-13 (1983-84).
Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. McDavid, 664 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Ky. 1984).
667 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983). This case is also discussed in Harvey &
Wiseman, First Party Bad Faith: Common Law Remedies and a Proposed Legislative
Solution, 72 Ky. L.J. 141, 164-75 (1983-84); Underwood, supra note 1, at 406 n.15.
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loss and loss of use of the dwelling, and (2) violation by State

Farm of "a duty to act in good faith in '4effecting a fair and
reasonable settlement of

. .

. [the] claims."

The insurer filed an answer raising arson and fraud as affirmative defenses and moved for summary judgment on the
second count of the complaint. State Farm cited a long line of
cases, including Deaton v. Allstate Insurance Co.5 and General

Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd6 for the principle
that Kentucky law did not pbrmit a claim for consequential and
punitive damages for breach of contract. The Christian Circuit
Court entered partial summary judgment in favor of State Farm
on the consequential and punitive damage issue.7 On appeal, the

Court of Appeals distinguished Deaton and Judd on the basis
that they were "nothing more" than breach of contract actions
in which the measure of damages was the amount agreed to be
paid.8

The Court of Appeals concluded that, unlike Deaton and
Judd, Feathers involved an action in tort rather than in contract.
The Court recognized "an independent tort arising from a
wrongful breach," 9 and basing its holding on the special nature
of a homeowner's fire insurance policy, held that consequential
and punitive damages could be given.10

The Court carefully qualified its opinion, however:
We intend no aid or comfort in this opinion to those who
misrepresent material facts or burn their property for personal

4 667 S.W.2d. at 694. The plaintiffs claimed that, as a result of State Farm's
refusal to settle with them promptly, they "suffered acute anxiety and mental suffering,

and loss of consortium." Id.
548 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
400 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1966).
7 667 S.W.2d at 693.
See id. at 696.
9Id.
10See id. at 696-97. The Court stated:
In our opinion, the homeowner's fire policy is unique. We are not dealing
with the purchase and sale of a box of shoe laces. The purchaser of a fire
insurance policy is buying peace of mind and a cushion to help himself in
the event his home is damaged or destroyed. He is usually economically
devastated after a fire and may have no source of money to replace what
he has lost other than the proceeds of the insurance policy he has purchased
and relied upon.
Id. at 696.
6
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gain. Nevertheless, once the policyholder has substantially
complied with the terms and conditions required by the policy,
and there is no substantial or credible evidence that the policyholder directly or indirectly set fire to his property for personal gain, then at that point, the insurance company becomes
akin to a fiduciary as to the sums that may be owed under the
policy.",
In view of this emphasis on the special nature of the homeowner's fire policy, it is conceivable that future courts will
2
narrowly construe Feathers.
A second Kentucky case also extended the potential for
insurer's liability for failure to act in good faith. In Eskridge v.
Educator & Executive Insurers, Inc., 3 the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that an insurer would be liable for the complete
amount of a judgment, even if in excess of the policy limits, for
4
erroneously denying coverage and refusing to defend.1
The case arose from a collision on September 8, 1968, involving automobiles driven by Lillian Passmore and Gene Eskridge who was killed.' 5 The Passmore vehicle had been insured
for the period from the eleventh of January to the eleventh of
July, 1968, subject to renewal. The insurer mailed Passmore a
premium due notice to renew her policy through the eleventh of
January, 1969. After receiving no response from Passmore, another premium notice was mailed by the insurer. 6 Passmore
claimed that the check for the renewal premium was mailedafter receipt of the first notice and before the mailing of the
second-in an envelope provided by the insurer. The insurer
contended that it never received the check, and that consequently, the policy lapsed on the eleventh of July, 1968. When
Passmore notified the insurer of the accident, the insurer refused
to conduct any investigation, settlement negotiations or defense
7
of the claim.'

Id.
This is particularly the case in view of the fact that the opinion was issued after
settlement of the case and filing of a motion to dismiss the appeal. See Harvey &
Wiseman, supra note 3, at n.162.
1 677 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1984).
"

Id. at 889.

Id. at 888.

Id. The insurer did not mail any further notice to the insured, nor did the
insurer specifically advise the insured that the policy had lapsed. Id.
16

17

Id.
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Passmore's coverage limit under the policy was $20,000.
Eskridge recovered a judgment against Passmore in excess of
$100,000. In amended pleadings, Eskridge then made claim
18
against the insurer for the entire amount of the judgment.
The trial court found "that Passmore did properly mail a
check to the [insurer] . . . , that such mailing constituted payment for the renewal of the policy and that the policy, as
renewed, was in effect on the date of the accident."1 9 It held
the insurer liable for the entire amount of the award plus interest
from the date of the judgment. 20 The Court of Appeals affirmed
that the policy was in effect but reversed as to the amount of
recovery and limited the insurer's liability to the amount of its
21
policy limits.
After granting discretionary review, the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that the decision of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the policy was in effect at the time of the accident
was not before it for review. 22 With the existence of the policy
citing Manchester Insurance & Inthus established, the Court,
demnity Co. v. Grundy23 as authority, held the insurer to a duty
of good faith to protect its insured from an unreasonable risk
of adverse judgment in excess of the limits of the policy. 24
The Court recognized that no previous Kentucky court had
considered the issue of whether an insurer's good faith, but
erroneous, belief that there was no policy coverage constituted
a defense to a claim against the insurer for damages in excess
of the policy limits. After examining cases from other jurisdictions which reached opposite conclusions, the Court adopted the
is Id.
19Id.

2 Id.
21 Id.
22 See id. at 889. This portion of the opinion is of particular significance in the
area of appellate procedure. The insurer had not moved for discretionary review, but
contended in its brief before the Kentucky Supreme Court that, once discretionary review
had been granted to any party, the entire decision of the Court of Appeals was open
for a review. The Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the issues to be
reviewed by the Court were limited to those raised in a properly granted motion for
discretionary review. Thus, the Court held that "[t]he decision of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the policy in issue was in effect at the time of the accident is not
properly before us for review." Id.
531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1976).
24 677 S.W.2d at 889.

19851

INSURANCE

view "that a mistaken belief that coverage is not provided by
the policy cannot justify a breach of the contract. ' 25
In considering the damages available for breach of the insurance contract, the Court held that "the party aggrieved by
the breach is entitled to recover all damages naturally flowing
from the breach." 26 Since the insurer had refused to conduct
settlement negotiations-and thereby refused to accept a settlement offer within the policy limits-the Court proceeded to
consider whether the insurer's refusal to settle was in bad faith
so as to impose liability for the entire judgment on the insurer. 27
The Court held that the insurer's good faith, but mistaken,
belief that the policy does not provide coverage is irrelevant in
determining whether the refusal to settle within policy limits was
in bad faith.2 Limiting its inquiry to the factors enunciated in
Grundy-'"the probability of recovery, the likelihood that judgment will exceed the policy limits, negotiations for settlement,
offers to settle within or for less than the policy limits, and
whether the insured made a demand for settlement" 29-the Court
held that the trial court's finding of bad faith was not clearly
erroneous.3 0 Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court's
31
judgment for the full amount of the damages plus interest .
In effect, the Court placed an artificial, and arguably incorrect,3 2 restriction on the factors to be considered in assessing bad

2s Id.
26

Id.

2 Id.

2 Id.
9 Id. at 890.
30 Id.
31

Id.

31 The Court's decision departs from the traditional rule that an insurer's good

faith but mistaken belief that there was no coverage would result in its being liable only
for the policy limits plus costs of defense. See W. YoUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
Tm LAW OF INSURANCE 323 (1971). "[G]enerally, an insurance company which in good
faith mistakenly refuses to defend a claim is not liable beyond the limits of its policy;
under such circumstances the insurer would be liable for the costs of the defense and
interest. . . ... 7 C.J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4689 at 210. (Berdal
ed. 1979). See, e.g., Gordon v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 285 N.E.2d 849 (N.Y.

1972). "More than an 'arguable case' of coverage responsibility must be shown before
liability may be imposed for breach of an implied covenant to act in good faith in
denying coverage." Id. at 850-51. "For a breach of an obligation to defend [absent bad
faith], the measure of damage is the cost of defense to the insured and the amount of
recovery, if any, against the insured within the policy limits." Id. at 854.
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faith in a failure to settle within policy limits. Since a good faith
belief that a policy is not in effect would normally lead an
insurer to refuse to settle, it seems that such a belief should be
at least a factor in determining whether the insurer was in bad
faith in refusing to settle within the policy limits. 3
B. Coverage
In Pierce v. West American Insurance Co., 34 the appellant,
a disabled widow in her seventies, sued West American, alleging
that the insurer failed to compensate her for a loss sustained as
a result of a series of fraudulent transactions on a bank checking
account in her name. The transfers were made through electronic
fund transfers by means of a card inserted into an automated
teller machine. The appellant had apparently received the card
unrequested in the mail and given it to her housekeeper to
destroy. 35 However, the housekeeper kept the card, obtained and
completed the bank's application for a personal security number,
forged the appellant's signature, presented the application to the
bank, and obtained the personal security number applicable to
the appellant's account. The housekeeper used the card and
personal security number to appropriate money from the appellant's checking account. 36 After discovering the theft, the appellant notified West American of the unauthorized withdrawals
37
and made a claim.
The insurance policies covering the appellant contained the
following provisions:
Credit Card, Forgery and Counterfeit Money. We will pay up
to $500.00 for: a. The legal obligation of any insured to pay
because of the theft or unauthorized use of credit cards issued
to or registered in any insured's name. We do not cover use

33 This is particularly true in view of the Court's express recognition of the fact
that the premium check allegedly mailed by Passmore was neither deposited by the
company nor ever charged against Passmore's bank account. 667 S.W.2d at 888. As the
dissent noted: "There is no question that the refusal to defend was made in good
faith. . . . It is the judicial trapeze act which converts a good faith error into a lack of

good faith in settling which makes for an impossible situation." Id. at 890 (Stephenson,
J. dissenting).
14

655 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

11See id. at 35.
36 Id.
31 Id. at 36.
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by a resident of your household, a person who has been
entrusted with the credit card, or any person if any insured
has not complied with all terms and conditions under which
the credit card is issued. b. Loss to any insured caused by
forgery or alteration of any check or negotiable instru-

m ent.

....

31

The trial court overruled the appellant's motion for summary
judgment and entered summary judgment in favor of West
American. 39 The court held that an automated teller card was
not a "credit card" within the meaning of the insurance policy,
and that consequently the loss sustained by the appellant was
not covered by the insurance contract.4° The trial court, however,
did not consider the policy provision providing coverage for loss
caused by "forgery of any check or negotiable instrument. ' '"
The appellant argued that this latter provision afforded coverage.

42

The Court of Appeals noted that the forgery involved was
not the forgery of a check, but rather the housekeeper's forgery
of the personal security number application. 43 The appellant had
argued that the card was sufficiently analogous to a "check"
for the loss to fall within the policy provisions." The Court of
Appeals correctly noted that "electronic fund transfers" such as
the one in question are particularly vulnerable to crime due to
their "impersonal nature." 45 The Court recognized that transactions involving the use of checks or other negotiable instruments "where signatures of payers or drawers can be scrutinized
to guard against forgeries, is a lesser risk than that involved in
the use of electronic fund transfers." 46 The Court held that the
specific terms of the policy contemplated the lesser risk, and
that to hold otherwise would in effect create "a different insur-

"

40

Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added by the court).
Id. at 35.

Id.

11Id. at 36.
,2 Id.
43 Id.
" Id.
's Id. (citing Am. Jur.2d New Topic Service, Consumer and Borrower Protection
§ 156 (1982)).
46 Id.
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ance contract by virtue of the enlarged risk." 47 Consequently,
48
summary judgment in favor of West American was sustained.
In Wolford v. Wolfor'd, 49 the Supreme Court of Kentucky
construed the following coverage provision in an automobile
liability insurance policy: "We will pay all sums the insured
legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury or property
damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an accident
and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a
'50
covered auto.
In Wolford, a father had signed a driver's license application
for his son. On the fifth of September, 1979, the son, who had
turned seventeen and who had been living outside his parents'
home, returned home. When the son asked to use the family
car, his father refused because he believed the son was high on
5
drugs. The son then took the automobile without permission. 1
In the words of the Court:
The father immediately gave chase in another vehicle but lost
his son in traffic. He then called the police to report the theft
of his automobile. The police discovered the automobile and
a high speed chase ensued during which a police officer was
52
injured when the son rammed the police car.
The insurance company refused to defend the suit that followed.5"
The trial court ruled in a summary judgment that there was
no coverage for the son or for the father because the son was
driving without permission.5 4 The trial court also held that the
insurance company had no duty to defend the suit.5 5 Finally, it
found both son and father jointly and severally liable. 6 Subsequently, a jury awarded an $80,000 judgment against the Wol58
fords.57 The Court of Appeals affirmed.

"7Id.
11Id. at 37.
11 662 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1984).
10Id. at 837.
51 Id.
52

Id.

53Id.
, Id.
55 Id.
56

Id.

57

Id.
Id.

58
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Upon discretionary review, the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that the summary judgment releasing the insurer was in error.5 9
Even though the son was not covered because he was operating
the vehicle without the owner's consent, the insurance company
had agreed to pay all sums for which the insured father might
be liable because of use of a covered vehicle 0 The Court recognized that when the father signed the son's application for a
6
driver's license he became liable for the son's negligent acts. '
The Court concluded that the policy's coverage language "is not

limited to use authorized by the insured. There is no legal reason

why we should add such limiting language where none exists." 62
The Court ruled that the insurer was obliged to pay up to
its policy limits, $25,000, on the father's behalf. 63 It also held

that "[t]he insurance company must defend any suit in which
the language of the complaint would bring it within policy
coverage regardless of the merit of the action.'' 64 Because the
insurance company had failed to provide a defense, the Court
held that the insurer had to pay for Wolford's reasonable defense
65
expenses.
C.

Waiver and Conditions Precedent
Hornback v. Hornback" involved a domestic dispute after

which Mary Jo Hornback's husband allegedly set fire to their
59 Id.
60 Id.
11 Id. The relevant statute states:
Any negligence of a minor under the age of eighteen (18) who has been
licensed upon an application signed as provided by KRS 186.470, when
driving any motor vehicle upon a highway, shall be imputed to the person
who signed the application of the minor for the license. That person shall
be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by
the negligence.
KRS § 186.590(1) (1981).
662 S.W.2d at 837.
61 Id. at 838.
64 Id.
61 See id. In Eskridge v. Educator & Executive Insurers, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 887
(Ky. 1984), the Supreme Court held that the appropriate measure of damages was the
full amount of the judgment plus interest from the date of the judgment. Id. at 890.
Here the judgment was also in excess of policy limits, but the insurer was only required
to pay the policy limits and its insured's reasonable defense expenses. The difference is
explained by the fact that in Wolford, the question of whether the insurer was acting in
good faith was not in issue.
6 667 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. Cr. App. 1984). In this opinion the Court of Appeals took
the unusual step of quoting with approval.large portions of the trial court's opinion.
See id. at 401-03.
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house. Ms. Hornback immediately notified her insurance agent,
and the insurer's adjuster investigated the fire shortly thereafter.
The adjuster took a lengthy statement from Ms. Hornback concerning the circumstances surrounding the fire. This information,
however, provided no estimate of the total loss of either the real
or personal property. Several months later, the insurer sent Ms.
Hornback a proof of loss form and inventory sheets. These
forms were not returned to the company before suit was filed. 67
Based on the insured's failure to file a proof of loss, the
insurance carrier refused to pay the claim. The trial court concluded that filing a proof of loss was a condition precedent to
filing suit against the insurance company and dismissed Ms.
68
Hornback's claim against the insurer.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Ms. Hornback argued
that the trial court had erred in dismissing her claim against the
insurance company. She maintained that the company waived
its defenses by, among other things, investigating the fire. 69 She
argued that United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fyffe0
and Aetna Insurance Company v. Solomon ' established that the
insurance company had waived the necessity of filing a proof of
loss when its adjuster investigated the 1oss.72 Federal Kemper,
the insurer, cited Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 304.14280, 73 which provides that investigating a claim is not a waiver
of any provision of an insurance policy. 74
The Court of Appeals opinion reconciled the cases cited by
Ms. Hornback and KRS section 304.14-280 by recognizing that
an insurer needs a proof of loss to process a claim. Although

Id. at 400.
6s Id.
69 Id.
67

471 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1971).
511 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1974).
72 667 S.W.2d at 401.
13 This provision states in pertinent part:
Without limitation of any right or defense of an insurer otherwise, none
of the following acts by or on behalf of an insurer shall be deemed to
constitute a waiver of any provision of a policy or of any defense of the
insurer thereunder:
70
7'

(3) Investigating any loss or claim under any policy or engaging in negotiations looking toward a possible settlement of any such loss or claim.
KRS § 304.14-280 (1981).
4 667 S.W.2d at 401.
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there was no dispute regarding the fact that the insurance company had been informed of the loss, the opinion noted that
[a] proof of loss is necessary in addition to notice to provide
the insurance company with some reasonable basis to pay the
claim, or at least negotiate settlement of the claim. Fire insurance is not life insurance, and the insured is not entitled to
the full policy limits just because there is a fire."
The Court then considered the fact that Ms. Hornback's
statement to the adjuster did not reveal whether the home's
contents were damaged or destroyed in the fire, or the fair
market value of the contents. 76 The information received by the
adjuster simply did not satisfy the requirements of the proof of
loss and inventory sheets. In essence, the only significant facts
obtained were the time and cause of the fire, and the identity
of the owners and the mortgagee. As a result, although the
insurance company had full notice of the circumstances surrounding the loss, it did not have sufficient information to pay
77
or attempt to negotiate a settlement of the claim.
Consequently, the Court held that the insurance company
had not waived the requirement of a completed proof of loss. 78
The Court qualified its opinion, however, by quoting from the
trial court's opinion: " 'If an investigation reveals to the insurance company or its adjuster all or substantially all of the
information that would be included on a proof of loss, then this
Court is of the opinion that the need for a proof of loss is
obviated.' -79
D. Exclusions
In Beasley v. Trinity Universal Insurance. Co.80 the Court
of Appeals again 8' had occasion to construe the "business pur"
76

Id. at 402.
See id.

" Id. at 403.
79 See id.

71Id. at 402.

" No. 83-CA-2563-MR (Ky. Ct. App.), 31 Ky. L. SuMm. 9, at 1 (Ky. Ct. App.)
[hereinafter cited as KLS], discretionary rev. granted, 32 KLS 3, at 20 (Ky. Feb. 21,
1985).
.. The Court noted that there were no Kentucky cases "construing the business
pursuits exclusion under a homeowner's policy under similar facts." Id. slip op. at 4.
The Court cited two Kentucky cases which considered the business exclusion as applied
to other facts, namely Neal v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co., 522 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1975) and
Foster v. Allstate Ins. Co., 637 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). See No. 83-CA-2563MR, slip op. at 5.

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[VOL. 73

suit" exclusion 2 in a homeowner's liability policy of insurance.
While working on their farm, one of two brothers backed a
bulldozer over Jerry Beasley. Beasley was working on some
property which the brothers had recently sold by a land contract.
The contract required the brothers to clear trees from the property, and Beasley was injured while working for the brothers in
an endeavor to clear the land. The trees cleared during this
incident were ultimately used for lumber in remodeling one of
83
the brothers' houses.
The Court rejected the carrier's argument that the insured
brother was engaged in farming, and thus in "business," at the
time of Beasley's accident. Reasoning that the brother was not
farming because the farm had been sold, the Court held that
the business pursuits exclusion was inapplicable.8 4 The Court
also stated that "[s]elling the farm was not a 'business pursuit'
but a function incidental to its ownership. This falls within what
we call the policy's exclusion within an exclusion, namely, 'except activities therein which are ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits ...
.' "8 Bulldozing the trees was found to be
simply performing a condition of the sale.8 6 Moreover, the Court
pointed out that bulldozing trees to be sawed into lumber for
87
one of the brothers' homes was also not a business pursuit.
In TransamericaInsurance Group v. Young,"8 a husband and
wife owned separate vehicles with different insurers. Because his
vehicle was disabled, the husband was driving his wife's vehicle
when he was involved in an accident. The husband's insurance
company, Transamerica, sought to avoid coverage and filed a

The clause in the policy stated:
This policy does not apply: . . . (d) to bodily injury or property damage
arising out of business pursuits of any insured except activities therein
which are ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits...

82

"Business" means: (1) a trade, profession or occupation, including farming, and the use of any premises or portion of residence premises for any
such purposes ...
No. 83-CA-2563-MR, slip op. at 3-4.
8s Id., slip op. at 1-2, 8.
14

See id., slip op. at 8.

11Id., slip op. at 9.
86 Id.

See id. The court reasoned that had the trees been marketed, the business pursuit
exclusion would apply. See id.
11No. 83-CA-2364-MR (Ky. Ct. App.), 31 KLS 10, at 9 (Ky. Ct. App. July 13,
1984), motion for discretionaryrev. filed, 31 KLS 16, at 16 (Ky. Nov. 29, 1984).
87
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petition for declaration of rights. 89 The Transamerica policy stated
that it would cover a substitute vehicle when the insured vehicle
was withdrawn from normal use, and when the substitute vehicle
was not owned by the named insured. "Named insured" was
defined as both the insured and a spouse residing in the same
household. Additionally, the policy specifically stated that the
insuring agreement did not apply to a vehicle owned by the
named insured or a spouse. 90
The Court of Appeals recognized that the plain language of
the policy's temporary substitute vehicle clause clearly did not
extend coverage to vehicles owned by a spouse. 91 The Court

nevertheless concluded that the clause denying coverage for a
spouse's car as a temporary substitute vehicle was void because
it violated public policy:
Today, spouses frequently own motor vehicles with both dominion and ownership treated apart from the marriage. When
such a vehicle is used by a co-spouse as a temporary substitute
vehicle during the disabililty of his own automobile, we think
public policy demands that the use be covered by the temporary
substitute vehicle clause of his own policy. 92
The Court carefully stated, however, that it had "no quarrel
with [the] general exclusion of coverage to 'other vehicles' owned
by insureds (Named Insured and members of his household)
under the policy." 93 Only when coverage was extended to include
temporary substitute automobiles, during the incapacity of the
insured vehicle, was it unreasonable in light of public policy to
94
exclude a spouse's vehicle.

I1 slip op. at 2.
Id.,
90Id., slip op. at 4. The Transamerica policy contained the following provisions:
IV. While the described automobile . . .is withdrawn from normal use
...[the insurance this policy provides shall apply] to another automobile
not owned by the Named Insured while temporarily used as the substitute
for such automobile.
V. [T]he "Named Insured" shall be the Insured designated . . . or a

husband and wife residing in the same household....
(d) This Insuring agreement does not apply: (1) to any automobile owned
in full or in part by the Named Insured or spouse. ...
Id.
91Id., slip op. at 3.
Id., slip op. at 6.
91See id., slip op. at 8.
9 Id.
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Limits of Liability

Recently, in State Farm Mutual Insurance v. Moore,95 the
Court of Appeals construed a scope of liability clause in a
standard automobile insurance policy.9 6 William Harper caused
an accident in which Gary Moore was injured. Mr. Moore filed
a tort action against Harper for damages. The action was settled
for State Farm's "policy limit applicable to each person of
$50,000. ' ' 97 Subsequently, Moore's wife filed an action against
Harper seeking damages for loss of her husband's consortium.
She received a $50,000 judgment and then, because the defendant
was personally unable to satisfy the judgment, filed suit against
State Farm claiming that it was liable to her on its policy for
the $50,000 in damages she had been awarded.95
The Court of Appeals held that the appellee was impermissibly attempting to enlarge the policy's limits to cover multiple
causes of action. 99 The Court reasoned that Ms. Moore's "claim
for loss of consortium arose solely out of one accident in which
one person, her husband," was injured. 1°° The Court of Appeals
then held that the limit of liability specified in the tortfeasor's
automobile liability insurance policy applied not only to the
injured party's claim, but also to any claim of the injured party's
spouse for damages for loss of consortium.10 Because State
Farm had already paid Moore's husband the applicable policy
limits, the insurer was not liable to Moore for the judgment
rendered in her separate action for loss of consortium. 02

91No. 83-CA-2704-MR (Ky. Ct. App.), 31 KLS 10, at 18 (Ky. Ct. App. July 27,
1984), discretionary rev. granted, 32 KLS 1, at 21 (Ky. Jan. 9, 1985).
16

The provision stated:

The limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable to "each
person" is the limit of the company's liability for alldamages arising out
of bodily injury sustained by one person in any one accident, and subject
to this provision, the limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable
to "each accident" is the total limit of the company's liability for all such
damages for bodily injuries sustained by two or more persons in any one
accident.
Id., slip op. at 2 (emphasis added by court).
97See id.
" Id.
99 See id., slip op. at 3.
1'o
Id. (emphasis added) (citing 15 CoucH oN INsuRAIcE § 56.44 (1966); 8A C.J.
APPLEMAN, supra note 32, at § 4893).
10,
See No. 83-CA-2704-MR, slip op. at 2-3.
- Id., slip op. at 4.
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II.

A.

MOTOR VEHICLE REPARATIONS ACT

Threshold
KRS section 304.39-060(2)(a), 03 the Motor Vehicle Repara-

tions Act (MVRA), abolishes tort liability for economic losses
payable as basic reparation benefits (up to $10,000), and for
damages for noneconomic losses (pain, suffering, mental anguish
and inconvenience) unless the plaintiff can meet one of the
"threshold" conditions of KRS section 304.39-060(2)(b). 1° The
Kentucky Court of Appeals rendered three decisions during the
Survey period which construe the threshold provision.
In Smith v. Meyer,105 the Court held that expenses incurrec
for doctors' evaluations conducted for the insurance carrier'
information, which provide no direct medical benefit to th
plaintiff, were to be excluded in calculating whether the medic,
expenses were equal to or greater than the $1,000 threshol

KRS § 304.39-060(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1984) provides:
Tort liability with respect to accidents occurring in this Commonwealth and arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle is "abolished" for damages because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease to the extent the basic reparation benefits provided in this subtitle
are payable therefor, or that would be payable but for any deductible
authorized by this subtitle, under any insurance policy or other method of
security complying with the requirements of this subtitle, except to the
extent noneconomic detriment qualifies under subsection (2)(b) hereof.
KRS § 304.39-060(2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1984) provides:
In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator
or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been
provided as required in this subtitle, or against any person or organization
legally responsible for his acts or omissions, a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience because
of bodily injury, sickness or disease arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of such motor vehicle only in the event that the
benefits which are payable for such injury as "medical expense" or whicl
would be payable but for any exclusion or deductible authorized by thi,
subtitle exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), or the injury or diseasi
consists in whole or in part of permanent disfigurement, a fracture to
weight-bearing bone, a compound, comminuted, displaced or compresse
fracture, loss of a body member, permanent injury within reasonab'
medical probability, permanent loss of bodily function or death. Ar
person who is entitled to receive free medical and surgical benefits shall I
deemed in compliance with the requirements of this subsection upon
showing that the medical treatment received has an equivalent value of
least one thousand dollars ($1,000).
"1 660 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
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In addressing the issue of whether an

evaluation could be included as a "medical expense" within the
meaning of KRS section 304.39-020(5)(a),107 the Court stated:
"Such expense may be included in meeting the threshold only if
it can be shown that the evaluations were also needed by and
provided a direct benefit for the injured party."1 8
The Meyer Court also determined that rehabilitation expenses
were appropriate "medical expenses" under KRS section 304.39020(5)(a).109 The Court held, however, that a jury issue was
created as to whether such services were reasonably needed."0
According to the Court it was immaterial whether expenses
incurred for rehabilitation and evaluations directly benefitting
the injured party were paid by an insurance carrier, or by the
injured person."' Finally, the Court of Appeals reserved for a
ater day whether marriage counseling allegedly necessitated by
2
he injuries could be included as a "medical expense."11
3 the Court of Appeals reversed a
In Thompson v. Piasta,"

"ial court because of an instruction which had asked the jury
determine the plaintiff's "reasonable [medical] expenses,"
here no evidence had been presented that the bills were unrea-

See id. at 11.
,0' KRS § 304.39-020(5)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1984) provides:
"Medical expense" means reasonable charges incurred for reasonably
needed products, services, and accomodations, including those for medical
care, physical rehabilitation, rehabilitative occupational training, and other
remedial treatment and care. "Medical expense" may include non-medical
remedial treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious
method of healing. The term includes a total charge not in excess of one
thousand dollars ($1,000) per person for expenses in any way related to
funeral, cremation, and burial. It does not include that portion of a charge
for a room in a hospital, clinic, convalescent or nursing home, or any
other institution engaged in providing nursing care and related services, in
excess of a reasonable and customary charge for semi-private accomodations, unless intensive care is medically required. Medical expense shall
include all healing arts professions licensed by the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. There shall be a presumption that any medical bill submitted is
reasonable.
660 S.W.2d at 11.
See Id. This determination appears mandated by the language of the Statute.
107 supra for the text of the Statute.
See id.
See id.

See id.
562 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
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sonable." 4 The Court noted that, in light of the statutory presumption of reasonableness, I5 the issue was whether the expenses
were "reasonably needed. ' '" 6 The Court then presented two "no
fault" threshold instructions, which it held the jury should answer before addressing the issue of damages:
Question No. 1. Do you find from the evidence that the
Plaintiff, Doris Piasta, incurred charges in excess of $1,000.00
for reasonably needed expenses for products, services, and
accommodations, including those for medical care and physical
rehabilitation as a result of the collision of September 29,
1977?
Question No. 2. Do you find from the evidence that the
Plaintiff, Doris Piasta, sustained permanent bodily injury within
reasonable medical probability as a result of the collision of
7
September 29, 1977?"
In Piasta, the plaintiff had neither applied for, nor been
paid, basic reparation benefits. The defendant argued that a
judgment rendered in the plaintiffs favor must include a credit
against any jury verdict for amounts that are payable as basic
reparation benefits. The defendant maintained these amounts
were uncollectable as damages pursuant to KRS section 304.39060(2)(a).118
The Court of Appeals agreed and held that it was immaterial
whether basic reparation benefits had been paid to an injured
party subject to the MVRA, and that "such party is not entitled
to an award from the defendant in a trial on liability for any
item of damages for which such benefits are payable.""' 9
In the third case considering the threshold provision, the
Court of Appeals addressed the distinction between "reasona-

See id. at 226.
M"The last sentence of KRS § 304.39-020(5)(a) specifically provides a presumption
of reasonableness. See note 107 supra for the text of the Statute.
HI 662 S.W.2d at 226. The Court cited Bolin v. Grider, 580 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1979),
as authority for this standard. See 662 S.W.2d at 226.
W662 S.W.2d at 227.
M See note 103 supra for the text of the statute.
"9 662 S.W.2d at 226. See also Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kidd, 602
S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1980) (injured party not entitled to an award of damages for any item
already paid by the injured party's insurer).
14
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ble" and "necessary" medical expenses within the meaning of
KRS section 304.39-020(5)(a).' 20
In McMillion v. Garrett,121 the Court held that a chiropractor's charges are "medical expenses"' 22 contemplated under the
MVRA and as such "are statutorily presumed to be 'reasonable.' "123 Because there was no proof attacking the statutory
presumption of the "reasonableness" of the chiropractor's
charges, the Court held that it was improper for the trial court
to ask the jury by interrogatory if the medical expenses incurred
were "reasonable."' 24
The Court noted, however, that there was admissible evi2
dence attacking the "necessity" for the chiropractic charges.'1
As a result, the Court concluded that the instructions described
in Thompson v. Piasta2 6 "should be followed to the extent that
the evidence and the issues so formed dictate.' ' 2 7 The Court
held that if the "reasonableness" of the charges were challenged
by other evidence, upon retrial that issue could be included in
28
the instructions as well.'
B.

Subrogation

KRS section 304.39-070 gives the plaintiff's reparation obligor, after it has paid basic reparation benefits to the plaintiff,
' See note 107 supra for the text of the statute.
2I Nos. 83-CA-499-MR, 83-CA-722-MR (Ky. Ct. App.), 31 KLS 7, at 8 (Ky. Ct.
App. May 25, 1984), discretionary rev. granted, 31 KLS 16, at 15 (Ky. Nov. 28, 1984).
McMillion also dealt with a very important procedural matter. The appellee crossappellant Garrett challenged the trial court's failure to grant her a summary judgment
on the basis of res judicata. See id. slip op. at 6. The appellant McMillion had first
filed a complaint in the small claims division of district court, and recovered $412.95 in
property damage, plus costs, in an agreed judgment. Id.
Some three months later, McMillion filed this complaint for personal injuries
suffered in the same accident. Id., slip op. at 1, 6. McMilion argued that the second
claim should not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as she had no claim until
she had met the statutory threshold set out in KRS § 304.39-060(2)(b). Id., slip op. at
8.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed with Garrett. It held that it was "the date
of the injury, and not the time the conditional threshold is crossed" that gave rise to
the claim. As such, the claim for personal injuries was barred by res judicata. Id., slip
op. at 9.
'2

Id., slip op. at 3.

123

Id.

124

See id., slip op. at 4.

See id.
See text accompanying note 117 supra.
121 Nos. 83-CA-499-MR; 83-CA-722-MR, slip op. at 5.
12 Id., slip op. at 5-6.
12
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the right to recover the amount of these benefits from the
tortfeasor's reparation obligor.129 In Grange Mutual Casualty
Co. v. McDavid,13 ° the Supreme Court of Kentucky applied its
recent opinion in Stovall v. Ford,131 and held that a reparation
obligor has the right to intervene and assert its subrogation claim
in a case in which (1) the trial court entered an agreed order
dismissing, with prejudice, the complaint brought by the plaintiff
against the tortfeasor after the reparation obligor's motion to
intervene had been filed, and (2) the trial court entered no order
132
on the motion to intervene.
The reparation obligor had appealed the trial court's entry
of the dismissal order, on the basis that the reparation obligor
was precluded from maintaining its statutory right of subrogation.' 33 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the reparation ob34
ligor was not a party and consequently dismissed the appeal.'
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and held that the reparation obligor had standing to appeal. 35 The Supreme Court also
held that, on the facts of this case only, the reparation obligor's
failure to name the tortfeasor's reparation obligor, also a non36
party, as an appellee did not render the appeal defective.'

'- KRS § 304.39-070(3) (1981) provides: "A reparation obligor shall have the right
to recover basic reparation benefits paid to or for the benefit of a person suffering the
injury from the reparation obligor of a secured person as provided in this subsection. ..
"
'3 664 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1984).
'1 661 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1983). In Stovall, while the basic reparation obligor's
motion to intervene was pending, the trial court entered a summary judgment against
the plaintiff, based on the fact that the plaintiff had settled the claim and entered a
release. The trial court then overruled the motion to intervene. The Kentucky Supreme
Court stated that "Home Insurance [the basic reparation obligor] was the real party in
interest . . . and the only party who could give the tortfeasor and his insured a release
for elements of damages covered by basic reparations benefits." Id. at 470. Accordingly,
the Court held that settlement and release did not "affect Home Insurance Company's
right to collect its subrogation claim assuming Home can establish tort liability against
Ford [the defendant]." Id. at 470. The case is discussed in Underwood, supra note 3,
at 430-31.
664 S.W.2d at 934.
,4 Id. at 933. Although the Court of Appeals found the insurance company
continued to have a right of action in the trial court, the Supreme Court asked "Where
and How?" Id.
"4 Id.
See id. at 935.
' See id. The Court stated, "We must either join the trial court in disregarding
Grange Mutual's [the reparation obligor's] statutory right to intervene or extend existing
appellate procedures to permit this appeal." Id. The Court fashioned an equitable remedy
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The Supreme Court held that in all future appeals the secured
person's insurance carrier must be named as an appellee. 37 The

Court added that, in addition to serving notice of appeal on
counsel of record in the underlying litigation, notice must also
be separately served on the secured person's insurance com38
pany. 1

Finally, in Morris v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.,

39

the

Court of Appeals, applying KRS section 304.39-070(5),140 held
that the appellants, attorneys for the injured party, were entitled

to attorneys' fees. 141 The court followed its holding in Woodall
v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co. 42 and held that determination
of the amount of the fee would lie "within the sound discretion
43
of the trial court." 1
C.

Statute of Limitations
The Supreme Court of Kentucky decided three cases con-

struing the two-year statute of limitations set forth in the MVRA,
KRS section 304.39-230(6). 44 In Floyd v. Gray,14 the Court was
faced with the issue of whether a wife's claim for loss of con-

and held that, in the present case only, notice to the secured person's attorney was
sufficient. See id. The attorney had been employed by the insurance company to represent
its insured, and the Court reasoned that the attorney would presumably "keep [the
insurance company] advised and represent its interest so long as it does not conflict with
the interest of Dickenson, the insured." Id. at 934.
,'7
See id. at 935.
138

Id.

657 S.W.2d 248 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
KRS § 304.39-070(5) (1981) provides:
An attorney representing a secured person in any action filed under
KRS 304.39-060 shall be entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee in the event
that reparation benefits paid to said secured person by that secured person's
reparation's obligor are reimbursed by any insurance carrier on behalf of
a tortfeasor who is the defendant in any such action filed by the said
secured person or in the event such potential "action" is settled by said
potential tortfeasor's insurance carrier on his behalf prior to the filing of
any such suit.
"1 657 S.W.2d at 249.
131
'4

IQ

648 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1983).

657 S.W.2d at 249.
The statute states: "An action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.39060 [the threshold provision] may be commenced not later than two (2) years after the
injury, or the death, or the last basic or added reparation payment made by any
reparation obligor, whichever later occurs." KRS § 304.39-230(6) (1981).
14s 657 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1983).
'"
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sortium was subject to the two-year statute of limitations set out
in the MVRA or the one-year statute of limitations set out in
KRS section 413.140(l)(a).' 46 While recognizing that KRS section
304.39-230(6) provides a statute of limitations for "those actions
involving motor vehicle collisions which fall within the purview
of No-Fault benefit recovery which have met or exceeded the
statutory thresholds of KRS section 304.39-060(2), '47 the Court
determined that an action for loss of consortium did not fall
within the parameters of the MVRA. 14 Instead, it held that loss
of consortium is an independent cause of action required to be
brought within one year after the injury. 149
Justice Leibson filed a dissenting opinion 5 ° in which he
argued that a claim for loss of consortium is "an action for tort
liability" within the meaning of KRS section 304.39-230(6) and,
hence, falls within that provision's two-year statute of limitations.' Additionally, he argued that under Kentucky Rule of
Civil Procedure 15.03(1),52 the rule allowing amended pleadings
to relate back to the filing date of the original pleadings, the
complaint filed by the husband two months after the accident
tolled the statute of limitations on his wife's claim for loss of
consortium. '51
The Supreme Court in Bailey v. Reeves' 54 held that the
MVRA's two-year statute of limitations applied in a case where
the defendant was a nonmotorist-the owner of a cow struck
by the plaintiff. 5 5 The cow's owner argued that the two-year
statute of limitations was "applicable only with respect to actions
for tort liability against an owner, operator or occupant of a

"4 The statute reads: "(1) The following actions shall be commenced within one

(1) year after the cause of action accrued: (a) An action for an injury to the person of
the plaintiff, or of her husband, his wife, child, ward, apprentice or servant." KRS §
413.140(I)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
1,7 657 S.W.2d at 938.

- See id. at 937.
See id. at 938.
See id. at 940-43.
Id. at 940.
15 The Rule states:
"Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to
be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the
original pleading." KY. R. Crv. P. 15.03(1).
M 657 S.W.2d at 942.
4 662 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1984).
- See id. at 833.
141
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motor vehicle."' 5 6 The Supreme Court, however, held that KRS
section 304.39-230(6)157 contained no such limiting language.1 8
Justice Leibson, writing for the Court, distinguished the Court's
holding in Floyd v. Gray5 9 as follows:
In Gray we decided that strictly speaking the wife of a victim
was not, herself, an accident victim, and not within the class
whom the Act was designed to protect. By the same reasoning,
here the plaintiff is the victim of the motor vehicle accident
and is within the class whom the Act is designed to protect,
regardless of whether the tortfeasor is a motorist or a nonmotorist. ,60
Finally, in Lemmons v. Ransom, 6 ' the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that an infant (or a person under disability) has two
years after attaining majority (or release from disability) to bring
162
a tort action for injuries received in an automobile accident.
The plaintiff in Lemmons was injured in an automobile accident
in 1975 at the age of thirteen. He attained majority on the eighth
of September, 1980, and filed a lawsuit to recover for his personal injuries on the thirty-first of August, 1982. The trial court
dismissed the complaint as barred by the MVRA's two-year
statute of limitations. 6 3 The Court of Appeals reversed the de64
cision, holding that the saving statute, KRS section 413.170(1),
tolls the two-year statute of limitations under the MYRA. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, and approved
the language in Fann v. McGuffey, 165 which stated: "This pro-

116
Id. at 834.
"17 See note 144 supra for the text of the statute.
662 S.W.2d at 834.
657 S.W.2d at 936.
11 662 S.W.2d at 835 (emphasis in original).
16,
162

670 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1984).
Id. at 479.

Id.
-- KRS § 413.170(1) (1981) provides:
If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to
413.160, except for a penalty or forfeiture, was, at the time the cause of
action accrued, an infant or of unsound mind, the action may be brought
within the same number of years after the removal of the disability or
death of the person, whichever happens first, allowed to a person without
the disability to bring the action after the right accrued.
163

165

534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975).
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vision [KRS section 304.39-230(6) 166] remains subject to KRS
413.170(1), which extends the limitation period for infants and

persons of unsound mind."' 6 7
D.

Application- Who is to Pay Basic Reparation Benefits
(BRBs)
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kentucky

FarmBureau Mutual Insurance Co. 68 involved a dispute between
two insurance carriers as to which was primarily liable for payment of basic reparation benefits. Farm Bureau's insured was
killed while attempting to connect his disabled truck to a towing
vehicle when the former was struck by a vehicle insured by State
Farm. The trial court, ruling in favor of Farm Bureau, held that

Farm Bureau's insured was a "pedestrian" under KRS sections
304.39-050(1) 169 and 304.39-020(6).17o It further held that since
the decedent was a pedestrian, "the insurer of the moving vehicle

[State Farm] was primarily liable for payment of basic reparation
benefits. . . even though the disabled vehicle made contact with
[the decedent].''7 The trial court theorized that "the force

which fatally injured the 'pedestrian' came from the moving
72
vehicle."1

,6 See note 144 supra for the text of the statute.
367 670 S.W.2d at 479, quoting 534 S.W.2d at 775.
- 671 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
This provision states:
,69
The basic reparation insurance applicable to bodily injury to which this
subtitle applies is the security covering the vehicle occupied by the injured
person at the time of the accident or, if the injured person is a pedestrian,
the security covering the vehicle which struck such pedestrian. . . . A
pedestrian, as used herein, means any person who is not making "use of
a motor vehicle" at the time his injury occurs.
KRS § 304.39-050(1) (1981).
170 KRS § 304.39-020(6) (Cum. Supp. 1984) states:
"Use of a motor vehicle" means any utilization of the motor vehicle
as a vehicle including occupying, entering into and alighting from it. It
does not include (i) conduct within the course of a business of repairing,
servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles unless the conduct occurs
off the business premises, or (ii) conduct in the course of loading and
unloading the vehicle unless the conduct occurs while occupying, entering
into, or alighting from it.
671 S.W.2d at 259.
172 Id.
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The Court of Appeals reversed. Quoting the specific language
of KRS section 304.39-020(6),173 it held that Farm Bureau's
insured was a "user" as opposed to a "pedestrian," thus making
Farm Bureau primarily liable for basic reparation benefits. 74
The Court further posited that it would have reversed even
had it held that Farm Bureau's insured was a pedestrian. 75 The
Court reasoned that KRS section 304.39-050(1) provides that the
insurer of " 'the vehicle which struck such pedestrian' " will
pay the reparation benefits. 76 The decedent's vehicle was the
one which "struck" him. The Court based its holding on public
policy, determining that this construction was best suited to meet
one of the MVRA's express purposes-providing "prompt pay1' 77
ment to victims of motor vehicle accidents.
CONCLUSION

During this Survey period, Kentucky appellate courts issued
two significant decisions broadening the insurer's duty to act in
good faith. The Court of Appeals held that fire insurers in firstparty contractual actions have a duty to act in good faith in
effecting fair and reasonable settlements. In the event this dulty
is violated, they will be liable for consequential and punitive
damages. Whether this holding will be extended beyond firstparty fire insurance contract actions remains to be seen.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that an insurer's good
faith belief that a policy did not provide coverage was not
relevant to the issue of liability for failure to provide a defense
for its insured. In such situations an insurer determined to have
violated its duty of good faith may be held liable for the complete amount of a judgment in excess of policy limits plus interest
from the date of judgment.
The Kentucky appellate courts also examined coverage provisions, exclusions and limits of liability. In most instances, they
demonstrated a justifiable reluctance to create different contracts

"7 See note 170 supra for the text of the statute.
11 671 S.W.2d at 259.
"I'See id. at 249-60.
176 Id. at 259, quoting KRS § 304.39-050(1) (emphasis added by court). See note
169 supra for the full text of the statute.
In 671 S.W.2d at 260.
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of insurance "by enlarging the risk contrary to the natural and
' 78
obvious meaning of the existing contract."'
Finally, both the Supreme Court of Kentucky and the Kentucky Court of Appeals provided additional interpretations of
the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act. Both courts addressed issues
arising from the Act's threshold, subrogation, statute of limitations, and user/pedestrian provisions.
While it is perilous to predict trends, it is conceivable that
in the near future Kentucky's two appellate courts will look for
opportunities to define further the insurer's convenant to act in
good faith. More than likely they will continue to demonstrate
a reluctance to broaden insurance contracts beyond the coverages, exclusions and limits agreed upon in their formation. Finally, they will continue the difficult task of interpreting the
Motor Vehicle Reparations Act.

173 See Pierce v. West American Ins. Co., 655 S.W.2d at 36 (citing Weaver v.
National Fidelity Ins. Co., 377 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1963)).

